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Abstract 
In this paper, we examine the role of relative productivity growth in real misalignment of 
exchange rates in Latin American countries. Specifically, we verify the validity of the Penn 
Effect for selected countries in this region. Our sample consists of fifteen countries from the 
Latin American region for the period 1951 to 2010. We employ both short- and long-panel 
data techniques, which allow us to experiment with estimators suitable for short and long 
time dimensions of panel data. The Penn Effect is found to be supported for the entire sample, 
and for subsamples. Relative productivity growth is dominant in the real exchange rate 
movement during periods of mild or weak speculative attacks, as compared with periods of 
severe speculative attacks. To correct for real misalignment of currencies in Latin America 
under speculative attacks, relative productivity growth must be sizeable.  
Keywords: Penn Effect, real exchange rate, productivity growth, Latin America 
JEL Classification: C23, F21, F31 
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1. Introduction 
 
Countries in Latin America have experienced their fair share of real exchange rate 
misalignment and speculative attacks
1
 over the past 50 years. Detailed evidence concerning 
the nature of speculative attacks and real exchange misalignment in Latin America can be 
found in Calvo (1996), Broner et al. (1997) and Broner et al. (2005). Real misalignment, 
especially severe forms of currency misalignment, is of grave concern because it could 
trigger a currency crisis. Goldfajn and Valdes (1996) contend that if a currency over-
appreciates by more than 25 per cent, a smooth return is highly improbable, and state that in 
90 per cent of the cases in which such a level of real misalignment occurred in their sample, 
the currencies involved collapsed.  
 
In the literature on real misalignment of currencies in Latin America, various factors are 
identified as having contributed to the real misalignment. Edwards (1996) and Sachs and 
Tornell (1996), for instance, have blamed the Chilean and Mexican currency crisis on rigid 
nominal exchange rates with expansionary monetary policies. Blomberg et al. (2005) argue 
that political interests could induce excess real misalignment of currencies, and even currency 
crisis. They contend, for instance, that the authorities’ decision to abandon the currency board 
arrangement that tied the peso to the US dollar stimulated the Argentine currency crisis in 
2001 (see Blomberg et al., 2005). In addition, Kalter and Ribas (1999) noted that government 
expenditure played a significant role in the Mexican real misalignment and currency crisis in 
1994. 
 
From the traditional perspective in the literature, relative productivity growth (or 
differentials) has been widely credited for real exchange misalignment (see Officer, 1976; 
Kravis et al., 1982; Rodrik, 2008; Gluzmann et al., 2012; Vieira and MacDonald, 2012). 
Indeed, the role of relative productivity growth on the real exchange rate was crucial to the 
verification of what is now known in the literature as the Penn Effect (see Samuelson, 1994). 
In essence, in terms of this theory, if the influence of productivity growth is neutralized 
alongside transaction costs and trade barriers, identical goods should trade at identical prices 
in different countries. However, as first noticed by Ricardo (1911), Harrod (1933), and Viner 
(1937), this does not happen. Balassa (1964), Samuelson (1964), and Bhagwati (1984) have 
                                                          
1
 A speculative attack is a situation in which investors (domestic and foreign) in the foreign exchange market 
sell their currency assets in enormous quantities, leading to a sharp depreciation of the local currency.  
2 
 
argued that productivity differences across countries imply that the purchasing power parity 
(PPP) would not always hold, as first conjectured by Cassel (1918). 
 
In this paper, we aim to examine whether relative productivity growth has played a role in the 
real misalignment of currencies in Latin America – that is, we aim to test the validity of the 
Penn Effect for Latin American countries. Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) found that 
productivity growth differences could not explain real exchange rate movements in Latin 
American and Caribbean countries during the period 1991 to 2001. They argued that even if 
these countries realised higher growth rates by implementing growth-oriented reforms, the 
subsequent growth would only be able to correct real misalignment in the short term; in other 
words, short-term growth would be insufficient to buffer the severity of speculative attacks 
experienced by these countries, especially during fixed exchange rate regimes. Our paper 
serves to explore whether their findings have changed over time, and, if the Penn Effect is 
supported, how large relative productivity growth differences will need to be in order to 
correct the impact of speculative attacks in Latin America.  
 
It is well documented that during the period leading the peso crisis of 1994 and 1995 in 
Mexico and its subsequent impact on neighbouring countries (notably Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile), as well as other emerging economies (i.e. the Tequila Effect), countries in Latin 
America were very vulnerable to frequent speculative attacks (see Calvo, 1996). Since then, 
these countries have shifted from fixed or intermediate exchange rate regimes to mostly 
floating regimes (see Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2003). It is generally believed that 
speculative attacks are very severe during fixed exchange rate regimes (see Krugman, 1979; 
Flood and Garber, 1984; Calvo, 1996; Mishkin and Savastano, 2001). Here, we attempt to 
examine the influence of relative productivity growth on the real exchange rate during 
different episodes of speculative attacks. This is a contribution to the existing literature. To 
do this, we divide our sample into two: pre-peso crisis (1951–1995), and post-peso crisis 
(1996–2010). Figure 1 provides a useful guide for demarcating the two episodes of 
speculative attacks. It shows that the corrections in the exchange rate were sharper prior to 
the peso crisis (pre-1995) than afterwards.  
 
To examine the Penn Effect, researchers in the area of exchange rates have used different 
techniques and datasets with varying degrees of success. Empirical studies based on cross-
sectional techniques have mostly refuted the validity of the Penn Effect (see De Vries, 1968; 
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Officer, 1976; Bergstrand, 1991; Choudhri and Schembri, 2010). Studies based on time series 
techniques have produced mixed conclusions (see Hsieh, 1982; Rogoff, 1992a; Strauss, 1995; 
DeLoach, 2001; Lothian and Taylor, 2008). However, the panel data studies have largely 
been very successful in supporting the Penn Effect (see De Gregorio et al., 1994; Chinn, 
1997; Canzoneri et al., 1999; Genius and Tzouvelekas, 2008; Chong et al., 2012). 
  
A quick survey of the panel data studies shows that the authors employed either short-panel 
or long-panel data techniques, but not both (see De Gregorio et al., 1994; Canzoneri et al., 
1999; Chong et al., 2012). However, each approach has its limitations when estimating the 
coefficient of the relative productivity growth differential term in the model. Short-panel data 
techniques will typically produce coefficient estimates that are influenced by the country 
dynamics, whereas long-panel data techniques will produce coefficient estimates that are 
largely influenced by time dynamics. We departed from the existing studies in that we 
utilised both techniques in order to better assess the influence of relative productivity growth 
on the real exchange rate. This constitutes a methodological contribution of the paper. In 
addition, the Penn Effect is best verified when the dataset possesses two characteristics: the 
real exchange rate must show persistent misalignment over the study period, and productivity 
must exhibit the tendency to grow. Real exchange rates and relative productivity growth in 
Latin America have exhibited these two crucial attributes, further justifying our study. 
 
The sample we employed in our study consisted of fifteen countries from the Latin American 
region for the period 1951 to 2010. The empirical results generally suggest that relative 
productivity growth has, indeed, played a crucial role in real misalignment of currencies in 
the Latin American region. The Penn Effect is well supported for these countries. 
 
In the next section, we present the empirical methodology. The results are presented and 
discussed in section 3, while section 4 contains the concluding remarks. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
2.1 The Theoretical Model 
 
The theoretical model which illustrates the implications of the Penn Effect was first 
rigorously presented in Rogoff (1992b). However, it must be noted that Harrod (1933) and 
Samuelson (1964) described the basic elements of the model in their works, and that Balassa 
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(1964) estimated a simple empirical model for the Penn Effect in his paper. Moreover, Kravis 
and Lipsey (1983), and Bhagwati (1984) also documented empirical evidence of the Penn 
Effect. The main feature of these earlier specifications is their focus on the supply side of the 
economy (see Officer, 1976; Hsieh, 1982; and Marston, 1987).  
 
To bridge this theoretical gap, Rogoff (1992b) proposes a fully-specified model for the Penn 
Effect which has its conceptual roots in the general equilibrium framework containing two 
Cobb-Douglas production functions for two domestically produced goods. These two 
domestically produced goods are tradable “T” and non-tradable “N”, which originated in the 
tradable sector and the non-tradable sector, respectively. Moreover, these two goods, Rogoff 
argues, are produced using three factors: labour “L”, capital “K”, and technology “A”. 
Specifically, Rogoff assumes that the two goods follow production functions of the form:  
 
𝑌𝑇𝑡 = 𝐴𝑇𝑡𝐾𝑇𝑡
𝜃𝑇𝐿𝑇𝑡
1−𝜃𝑇,                                                                                                                (1) 
𝑌𝑁𝑡 = 𝐴𝑁𝑡𝐾𝑁𝑡
𝜃𝑁𝐿𝑁𝑡
1−𝜃𝑁,                                                                                                               (2) 
 
where 𝑌𝑇𝑡 and 𝑌𝑁𝑡 denote the quantities of the tradable and the non-tradable goods at time 𝑡, 
respectively. 𝜃𝑇 and 𝜃𝑁 denote the share of 𝐿 and 𝐾 in the production of 𝑇 and 𝑁, 
respectively; 𝐴𝑇 and 𝐴𝑁 are the stochastic productivity shocks in sectors 𝑇 and 𝑁, 
respectively. Rogoff (1992b) assumes, in addition, that: (i) the law of one price holds in the 
tradable sector; (ii) there is perfect international capital mobility; (iii) there is perfect market 
competition; and (iv) there is perfect factor mobility between sectors of the economy. On the 
basis of these assumptions, he demonstrates that a change in the relative price of non-tradable 
goods depends on a change in the relative productivity of the two sectors in the form:  
 
𝑑𝑝 = (𝜃𝑁 𝜃𝑇⁄ )𝑑𝑎𝑇 − 𝑑𝑎𝑁,                                                                                                      (3) 
 
where 𝑑 is the differential operator; lower cases represent the logarithm of the variables; 𝑝 is 
the relative price of non-tradable goods in terms of tradable goods; and 𝑎𝑇 and 𝑎𝑁 are the 
stochastic productivity shocks in the tradable and non-tradable sectors, respectively. Rogoff 
argues that a more realistic result can be achieved if we take capital and labour as given in 
each of the sectors – to avoid instantaneous inter-sectoral mobility within the economy – and 
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if we assume that capital markets are closed to international borrowing and lending. In this 
case, we obtain the following result (see Rogoff, 1992b, p. 10):  
 
𝑑𝑝 = 𝛽𝑇𝑑𝑎𝑇 − 𝛽𝑁𝑑𝑎𝑁 − [(𝛽𝑇 − 1)𝑑𝑔𝑇 − (𝛽𝑁 − 1)𝑑𝑔𝑁],                                                   (4) 
 
where 𝛽 is the output–consumption ratio, and 𝑔 is the logarithm of government consumption. 
Rogoff (1992b) contends that equation (4) is identical to equation (3) because productivity 
shocks in equation (4) have similar form and relations to productivity shocks in equation (3). 
The theoretical relations in (3) and (4) have enabled empirical studies to capture the role of 
the demand side of economies on long-run real exchange rates. 
 
A review of the theoretical advancements that have been made following Rogoff’s (1992b) 
paper is beyond the scope of our paper. We refer the interested reader to Asea and Mendoza 
(1994), De Gregorio et al. (1994), and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), for earlier studies. For 
recent studies, the reader should consider Ghironi and Melitz (2005), Bergin et al. (2006), 
and Méjean (2008).  
 
2.2 The Empirical Model 
 
To arrive at an empirically meaningful model, it is important to link the theory and empirics. 
For a single-country analysis, 𝑝 in (4) is calculated by dividing the price of non-tradable 
goods by the price of tradable goods. However, for cross-country analysis, the bilateral real 
exchange rate between individual countries and a benchmark country is used (see Hsieh, 
1982; Marston, 1987). Hence, we can use the real exchange rate and the relative price of non-
tradable goods interchangeably (see Rogoff, 1992b, p. 8). This interpretation stems from the 
assumption that terms of trade is constant, so that the only source of real exchange rate 
fluctuation is changes in the relative price of non-tradable goods (see Rogoff, 1992b). 
Similarly, the relative real output per capita of the individual countries in terms of the 
benchmark country can be used to measure the relative productivity shocks of sectors 𝑁 and 
𝑇.1 These characterizations actually work better in the current study, since data on the price 
of tradable and non-tradable goods are very limited for the countries considered.  
 
                                                          
1
 Many empirical studies have actually used this proxy. See, for example, Faria and León-Ledesma (2003), 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Nasir (2004), and Chong et al. (2012). 
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Our objective, in this paper, is to examine whether relative productivity growth is crucial to 
real misalignment of currencies in Latin American countries. The first step towards achieving 
this objective is to construct the real exchange rate misalignment index. This measure is used 
to proxy 𝑝 in (4), the dependent variable which we are going to use for our analysis. 
Following Rodrik (2008), we extract the exchange rates (XRAT) and purchasing power parity 
(PPP) conversion factors from the Penn World Tables, version 7.1, compiled by Heston et al. 
(2012). We then construct the real exchange rate (under- or overvaluation) index as follows:  
 
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑅𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡⁄ ),                                                                        (5) 
 
where 𝑖 is the country under consideration, and 𝑡 is a one-year time window. We use a one-
year time window as against the five-year time window that has been used in studies such as 
those of Freund and Pierola (2008), Rodrik (2008), and Aghion et al. (2009) in order to 
capture the inherent noise effects in the annual dataset.  Note that XRAT and PPP are denoted 
in national currency units per US dollar. When RER is more than unity, it implies that the 
currency is more depreciated than the purchasing power parity implies (see Rodrik, 2008). 
The US is used as the benchmark country because historically its non-tradable goods are 
more expensive than those of Latin American countries. In addition, most of the international 
transactions involving the Latin American countries and their trade counterparts are denoted 
in US dollars. Moreover, other studies have also used the US as the benchmark country (see, 
for example, Lothian and Taylor, 2008; Chong et al., 2012). 
 
The standard simple empirical model for examining the role of relative productivity growth 
in real misalignment of currencies takes the form: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝜓𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡,                                                      (6) 
 
where 𝛾 and 𝜓 are parameters of the model, 𝜓 measures the response of the real exchange 
rate within the Latin American countries due to relative productivity growth, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the 
index of relative productivity of country 𝑖 in period 𝑡 which is proxied by the real GDP per 
capita of the home country relative to that of the US
1
, 𝑙𝑛 is the natural logarithm, and 𝑓𝑖 and 
                                                          
1
 Officer (1976) argued against using productivity growth and recommended relative productivity growth. 
Hence, we utilized relative productivity in line with this recommendation. 
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𝑓𝑡 are fixed effects for country 𝑖 and period 𝑡, respectively. 𝜉𝑖𝑡 is the error term for country 𝑖 
at time period 𝑡. 
 
The baseline argument for the existence of the Penn Effect is that non-traded goods are 
cheaper in poorer countries than in richer countries (see Harrod, 1933; Balassa, 1964; 
Samuelson, 1964; Bhagwati, 1984). Thus, the Penn Effect is valid if 𝜓 is negative and 
significant (see Rodrik, 2008; Gluzmann et al., 2012; Vieira and MacDonald, 2012). A 
number of studies have found 𝜓 to be negative and significant (see, for instance, Gala, 2008; 
Rodrik, 2008; Gluzmann et al., 2012; Vieira and MacDonald, 2012).  
 
The possible drawback of equation (6) is that it could have been under-specified. In theory, 
other factors (such as government consumption, trade openness, and terms of trade) could 
contribute to real misalignment of currencies (see Rogoff, 1992b; De Gregorio et al. 1994; 
Vieira and MacDonald, 2012). To avoid the problem of misspecification, we fit a model with 
control variables in the form: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝜓𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 +φ𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡.                                                             (7) 
 
All the variables in equation (7) except 𝑍 retain their definitions as before. 𝑍 is a vector of  
1xq variables representing the standard determinants of the real exchange rate considered in 
the exchange rate literature. In this paper, 𝑍 contains terms of trade, trade openness, and 
government debt burden.  φ is a vector of  qx1 parameters to be estimated. 𝜉 represents the 
white-noise error term.  
 
To keep our results tractable, we first estimate equations (6) and (7) by short-panel data 
techniques (i.e. techniques suitable for the short time dimension). We start with the fixed-
effects or within-effects estimator, using the robust variance option. Noting that the presence 
of endogeneity issues could render the results of the fixed-effects estimation meaningless, we 
follow up using the generalized method of moments (GMM) techniques developed for 
dynamic panels by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and 
Bond (1998). We use both the difference GMM and the system GMM options to estimate 
equation (7). In each case, we report the one-step and the two-step results. The difference 
GMM estimator performs poorly if the autoregressive parameters are too large or if the ratio 
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of the variance of the panel-level effect to the variance of idiosyncratic error is too large (see 
Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). For this reason, we provide results for 
both estimators and check for model adequacy using the Sargan Test for orthogonality of the 
instruments and error terms.  
 
In the long-panel data case (i.e. techniques suitable for the long time dimension), we first 
conducted stationarity tests for the variables. This step is important because, should the 
variables be non-stationary, the regression results would be spurious if the variables are not 
differenced. We checked the stationary status of the variables using the Levin, Lin and Chu 
(2002) and the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) tests for unit roots. Two of the variables, namely 
relative productivity and government debt burden, were non-stationary at levels, but the 
remaining ones were stationary at levels (see Table 2 in section 3). Since the variables are of 
mixed order of integration, cointegration testing is not applicable.
1
 We proceeded to estimate 
equation (7) with six long-panel data techniques: (i) pooled OLS with iid errors; (ii) pooled 
OLS with standard errors, given correlation over states; (iii) pooled OLS with standard errors, 
given general serial correlation in the error (up to four lags) and correlation over states;
2
 (iv) 
pooled OLS, given an AR(1) error
3
 and standard errors that are correlated over states; (v) 
pooled FGLS with standard errors, given an AR(1) error; and (vi) pooled FGLS, given an 
AR(1) error and correlation across states (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2010).
4
 
 
2.3 Data 
 
The panel dataset of Latin American countries employed in this paper consists of fifteen 
countries
5
 and covers the period 1951 to 2010. We used relative real GDP per capita to proxy 
relative productivity growth (i.e. domestic real GDP per capita divided by US real GDP per 
capita). The data on this variable was obtained from the Penn World Tables, version 7.1 
compiled by Heston et al. (2012). Terms of trade is measured as 𝑝𝑙_𝑥/𝑝𝑙_𝑚, and government 
debt burden is measured as 𝑐𝑠ℎ_𝑔. Both variables were extracted from Penn World Tables, 
                                                          
1
 For cointegration testing to be applicable in the panel data setting, all the variables must be non-stationary at 
levels. 
2
  The Newey-West-Type standard errors based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998). 
3
  For the reason for including an AR(1) error, see Beck and Katz (1995). 
4
 All computations in the paper are carried out using STATA 13. The do-file is available upon request. 
5
 These countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. We selected each of these countries by considering 
data availability for the study period. 
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version 8.0, compiled by Feenstra et al. (2013). Trade openness is measured as 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑐 and 
was extracted from Penn World Tables, version 7.1, compiled by Heston et al. (2012). 
 
3. The Empirical Results  
 
3.1 Influence of Relative Productivity on the Real Exchange Rate, 1951–2010   
 
In Table 1, we report the empirical results for Eqs. (6) and (7) which were estimated using 
short-panel data techniques. Panel [1] shows the estimate for Eq. (6), the simple empirical 
model. The coefficient of relative productivity, 𝜓, is negative and weakly significant (i.e. 
𝜓 = −.381 and 𝑡 = −1.86). Relative productivity growth appears to determine real 
misalignment of currencies in this model, and the Penn Effect is supported. The estimated 
impact of relative productivity growth on the real exchange rate is relatively high. This is not 
a cause for concern, since apart from relative productivity major determinants of real 
misalignments are not included in Eq. (6). In addition, potential endogeneity embedded in the 
within-effects estimation could also have caused the estimate to be so. In panel [2], we 
attempted to avoid the problem of misspecification by including some standard control 
variables. These control variables are terms of trade (LNTOT), trade openness (LNOPEN), 
and government debt burden (LNGOV). The within-effects estimation, after controlling for 
these variables, produced a negative and significant 𝜓 at the 10 per cent level (i.e. 𝜓 =
−.171 and 𝑡 = −1.91). The Penn Effect is supported here as well. The estimate of the 
coefficient term for relative productivity reduced significantly after controlling for model 
misspecification.  
 
As we have pointed out, the potential presence of endogeneity bias may have resulted in 𝜓 
being weakly significant. For the robustness of our empirical results, we controlled for 
potential endogeneity bias by estimating Eq. (7) with the GMM system and difference 
estimators for both the one-step and the two-step cases. These results are reported in panels 
[3] to [6]. In all these cases, 𝜓 is negative and strongly significant (i.e. around 1 per cent and 
5 per cent significance levels). The difference GMM overestimates 𝜓. The Sargan Test 
indicates that the system GMM results are better. In addition, the estimated 𝜓 in the case of 
the one-step and two-step system GMM appears closer to the within-effects estimate. Most 
important, the Penn Effect is present in all cases.  The within-effects and system GMM 
results suggest that a 10 per cent increase in relative productivity growth leads to between 1.3 
per cent and 1.6 per cent real appreciation of the currencies in Latin American countries.  
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We mentioned earlier that, like all other estimating techniques, the short-panel data 
techniques (i.e. techniques suitable for short time dimension) also have drawbacks. For 
instance, data on real exchange rates are not available over an extended period of time. This 
means that the power of the short-panel estimators is significantly lessened because the 
results tend to be influenced by country-effects. To provide estimates which do not suffer by 
being influenced by country-effects, we employed the long-panel data techniques (i.e. the six 
long-panel data estimators we stated in section 2).  
 
However, before we estimated Eq. (7) with the six long-panel data techniques, we examined 
the data-generating process of the variables using the Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC), and the Im-
Pesaran-Shin (IPS) tests for unit roots. The results for the unit root are reported in Table 2. As 
Table 2 shows, LNRER and LNTOT are level-stationary at 1 per cent significance level for 
both LLC and IPS. However, LNPROD and LNGOV were not level-stationary. Consequently, 
we differenced LNPROD and LNGOV once and they became stationary at 1 per cent 
significance level.  
 
The next natural step, after establishing that the data-generating process of the variables was 
mixed, was to report the results obtained from estimating Eq. (7) with the six long-panel data 
estimators. These results are reported in Table 3. Panels [1] to [3] report results obtained from 
the pooled OLS cases with different restrictions on the nature of the errors and correlation 
over states. For these cases, the estimated value of 𝜓 is negative and highly significant (i.e. 
𝜓 ≈ −0.345 and −12.90 < 𝑡 < −9.36), meaning that a 10 per cent increase in productivity 
growth normally generates real appreciation of the currencies of these countries by 
approximately 3.45 per cent. Panels [4] to [6] report cases where AR(1) errors are included in 
the estimation, with some other restrictions placed on the model. In these cases, the estimated 
values of 𝜓 have increased in absolute terms. 𝜓 nevertheless remains negative and highly 
significant (i.e. 𝜓 ≈ −0.40 and −9.12 < 𝑡 < −4.23). The approximate value of 𝜓 implies 
that when relative productivity growth increases by 10 per cent, the real exchange rate 
appreciates by approximately 4 per cent. The Penn Effect is also clearly supported in the 
long-panel data case. 
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The main concern here is that the evidence presented above did not factor in the influence of 
speculative attacks to which these countries have been subjected, especially in the past. Calvo 
(1996) has argued that prior to the peso crisis of 1994 and 1995 in Mexico, countries in Latin 
America were very vulnerable to frequent speculative attacks. These speculative attacks were 
particularly severe in the Latin American countries because most of them practised fixed 
exchange rate regimes. Under typical speculative attacks, exchange rates experienced sharp 
corrections – this occurred in the Latin American countries (see Figure 1, for example). The 
influence of relative productivity on real exchange rate will therefore differ under severe 
speculative attacks and mild speculative attacks.  Following the existing literature, we 
designated the period before 1996 as representing the period of severe speculative attacks, 
and the period from 1996 to 2010 as the period of mild speculative attacks. Hence, we 
divided the data into pre-peso crisis (1951–1995) and post-peso crisis (1996–2010). We then 
re-examined the role of relative productivity growth on real exchange rate by re-estimating 
Eq. (7) using these subsamples. These results are presented in turn.  
 
3.2 Pre-peso Crisis, 1951–1995 
  
Table 4 shows the estimates of Eqs. (6) and (7) generated using the short-panel data 
techniques. Panel [1] reports the within-effects estimate of Eq. (6), the simple empirical 
model. Here, the coefficient of relative productivity growth, 𝜓, is negative and weakly 
significant (i.e. 𝜓 = −.515 and 𝑡 = −2.00). After controlling for model misspecification (see 
Panel [2]), the impact of relative productivity on the real exchange rate was reduced to 
𝜓 = −.287 with  𝑡 = −1.88. The Penn Effect is supported at 10 per cent level.  The GMM 
estimates of Eq. (7) are reported in panels [3] to [6]. In all these cases, 𝜓 is negative and 
significant (i.e. around 1 per cent and 10 per cent significance level). As we have already 
seen, the difference GMM overestimates 𝜓 in this case too. The Sargan Test indicates that 
the system GMM results are better. The Penn Effect is present in all cases.  The within-
effects and system GMM results suggest that a 10 per cent increase in relative productivity 
growth leads to between 0.2 per cent and 2.7 per cent real appreciation of the currencies in 
the Latin American countries. 
 
The results we obtained from estimating Eq. (7) with the six long-panel data estimators are 
reported in Table 5. Panels [1] to [3] report results obtained from the pooled OLS cases with 
different restrictions on the nature of the errors and correlation over states. The estimated 
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value of 𝜓 is negative and highly significant (i.e. 𝜓 ≈ −0.303 and −9.71 < 𝑡 < −6.85). 
Panels [4] to [6] report cases where AR(1) errors are included in the estimation with some 
other restrictions placed on the model. The estimated values of 𝜓 have increased in absolute 
terms. 𝜓 remains negative and highly significant (i.e. 𝜓 ≈ −0.34 and − 0.35, and −6.87 <
𝑡 < −3.02).  
 
3.3 Post-peso Crisis, 1996–2010  
 
The within-effects estimates of Eqs. (6) and (7) are shown in panels [1] and [2] of Table 6. 
Here, we find overwhelming support for the Penn Effect. The coefficient of relative 
productivity growth, 𝜓, is negative and very significant in the simple model and the fully-
specified model (i.e. 𝜓 = −.918 and 𝑡 = −3.44, 𝜓 = −.992 and 𝑡 = −4.36, respectively). 
The GMM estimates of Eq. (7) are reported in panels [3] to [6] of Table 6. 𝜓 is negative and 
very significant in all these cases. The Sargan Test indicates that the system GMM results are 
better. The Penn Effect is strongly supported by the GMM results.  
 
Table 7 shows estimated results of Eq. (7) using the six long-panel data estimators. Panels [1] 
to [3] report results obtained from the pooled OLS cases with different restrictions on the 
nature of the errors and correlation over states. The estimated value of 𝜓 is negative and 
highly significant (i.e. 𝜓 ≈ −0.408 and −14.02 < 𝑡 < −9.32). Finally, panels [4] to [6] 
report cases where AR(1) errors are included in the estimation, with some other restrictions 
placed on the model. The estimated values of 𝜓 have increased in absolute terms. 𝜓 remains 
negative and highly significant (i.e. 𝜓 ≈ −.484 and − .494, and −14.15 < 𝑡 < −6.44). 
 
3.4 Unifying the Results 
 
Overall, the results suggest that the Penn Effect is well supported in the Latin American 
countries during the period 1951 to 2010.  Essentially, the evidence suggests that relative 
productivity growth played a significant role in real misalignment of currencies in these 
countries for the period studied. The magnitude of the impact of relative productivity growth 
on real exchange rate misalignment estimated for the entire period lies somewhere between 2 
and 4 per cent, on average. This finding is consistent with previous studies such as those 
conducted by Asea and Mendoza (1994), and Drine and Rault (2003). However, it contradicts 
those of Genius and Tzouvelekas (2008), and Astorga (2012), who found no evidence in 
support of the Penn Effect for a group of Latin American countries in their studies. 
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In addition to the above finding, our estimates show that relative productivity growth had a 
relatively weak impact on real misalignment of currencies during the period preceding the 
peso crisis (i.e. when speculative attacks were frequent and severe). The point estimate of this 
impact lies somewhere between 0.2 and 4 per cent. Relative productivity growth had a 
relatively strong impact on real misalignment of currencies after the peso crisis (i.e. when 
speculative attacks were mild and less frequent). The results differ somewhat from those 
reported by Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003), who found that productivity growth 
differences could not explain real exchange rate movements in Latin American and 
Caribbean countries during the period 1991 to 2001. Their assertion that higher output growth 
rates in these countries is not enough to correct real misalignment, especially under severe 
speculative attacks, is confirmed in this paper. This is because the impact of relative 
productivity growth on real exchange rate is found to be weak during the period preceding 
the peso crisis. Relative productivity growth is able to help correct real misalignment 
significantly only under moderate or weak speculative attacks. Relative productivity growth 
will therefore need to be very sizeable in order to correct the impact of speculative attacks on 
the currencies in Latin America. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we explored the role of relative productivity growth in real misalignment of 
currencies in Latin American countries. We specifically verified the validity of the Penn 
Effect for this group of countries. The sample we employed for our empirical analysis 
consisted of fifteen countries from the Latin American region for the period 1951 to 2010. 
Instead of using either short- or long-panel data techniques, as was done in earlier studies, we 
employed both techniques in order to report more convincing results. In addition, we 
separated the data into periods of frequent and speculative attacks and mild speculative 
attacks. This allowed us to assess the impact of relative productivity on real exchange rates in 
these countries during different episodes of speculative attacks. Overall, the results indicate 
that relative productivity growth has played a crucial role in the real misalignment of 
currencies in the Latin American region. Hence, the Penn Effect is supported by the empirical 
results. The influence of relative productivity growth is significantly stronger during episodes 
of mild speculative attacks than during episodes of severe speculative attacks. The empirical 
results that we obtained remain robust to endogeneity, general serial correlation in the error, 
14 
 
and correlation over and across states, among other restrictions. These results have a key 
policy implication. To correct the impact of speculative attacks on currencies in these 
countries, relative productivity growth needs to be very sizeable. Growth-oriented policies 
designed to improve economic growth as a way of aligning currencies in the Latin American 
countries may not be successful if similar policies are not designed to moderate speculative 
attacks in these countries. 
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Figure 1: Over and undervaluation in key Latin American countries during the period 1951–2010. 
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Table 1: Results for the Short-Panel Data (1951–2010)  
 
 
 
LNRER 
[1] 
 
FE (Within) 
[2] 
 
FE (Within) 
 
[3] 
 
Diff-GMM 
[One-Step] 
[4] 
 
Sys-GMM 
[One-Step] 
[5] 
 
Diff-GMM 
[Two-Step] 
[6] 
 
Sys-GMM 
[Two-Step] 
 
LNPROD 
 
 
LNTOT 
 
 
LNOPEN 
 
 
LNGOV 
 
 
 
Time Dummies 
 
Country Dummies 
 
Group Average 
 
Number of Lags 
 
Sargan Test 
[Prob > chi-squared] 
 
Observations 
 
-.381*  
(-1.86) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
900 
 
-.171* 
(-1.91) 
 
-.053 
(-0.54) 
 
.347** 
(3.00) 
 
.130 
(0.83) 
 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
900 
 
-.223*** 
(-4.02) 
 
-.182*** 
(-2.96) 
 
.068*** 
(2.08) 
 
.228*** 
(4.63) 
 
 
yes 
 
 
 
57 
 
2 
 
 
0.000 
 
855 
 
-.158** 
(-2.74) 
 
-.115*** 
(-2.98) 
 
.028 
(1.60) 
 
-.022 
(-1.10) 
 
 
yes 
 
 
 
58 
 
2 
 
 
0.000 
 
870 
 
-.889***  
(-2.66) 
 
-.419*** 
(-3.92) 
 
.693* 
(1.94) 
 
1.23** 
(2.39) 
 
 
yes 
 
 
 
57 
 
2 
 
 
.854 
 
855 
 
-.127** 
(-2.31) 
 
.003 
(0.01) 
 
.491*** 
(3.01) 
 
.280 
(1.52) 
 
 
yes 
 
 
 
58 
 
2 
 
 
.999 
 
870 
Note:  
(1) t-statistics are in parentheses. 
(2) *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
(3) FE = Fixed-effects Estimator, Diff = Difference Estimator, and Sys = System Estimator. 
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Table 2: Tests for Unit Roots of the Variables at Levels and First Difference  
Variable LLC [𝒕𝜹
∗ ] 
 
IPS [𝒛?̃?−𝒃𝒂𝒓] 
LNRER 
 
LNPROD 
 
LNTOT 
 
LNOPEN 
 
LNGOV 
 
∆LNPROD 
 
∆LNGOV 
-3.8609*** 
 
-2.3807** 
 
-2.7475*** 
 
-2.5068*** 
 
-0.5704 
 
-17.4591*** 
 
-24.7958*** 
-4.2894*** 
-0.6648 
 
-3.3534*** 
 
-2.7696*** 
 
-0.5663 
 
-16.8599*** 
 
-18.7936*** 
Note:  
(i) ** and *** denote rejection of H0 at 10% and 5%, respectively. 
(ii) ∆ denotes the first difference operator. 
    
 
 
Table 3: Results for Long-Panel Data Techniques (1951–2010) 
 
Variable 
[1] 
OLS_iid 
[2] 
OLS_cor 
[3] 
OLS_DK 
[4] 
AR1_cor 
[5] 
FGLSAR1_cor 
[6] 
FGLSCAR 
 
LNPROD 
 
 
LNTOT 
 
 
LNOPEN 
 
 
LNGOV 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
Time Dummies 
 
Group Average 
 
Observations 
 
-0.345*** 
(-10.14) 
 
-.0331 
(-0.71) 
 
.092*** 
(3.67) 
 
-.015 
(-0.57) 
 
-3.349 
(-2.14)** 
 
yes 
 
60 
 
900 
 
-0.345*** 
(-12.90) 
 
-0.0359 
(-0.78) 
 
.092*** 
(3.78) 
 
-.015 
(-0.76) 
 
-3.349 
(-1.81)* 
 
yes 
 
60 
 
900 
 
-.345*** 
(-9.36) 
 
-.033 
(-.33) 
 
.092 
(1.63) 
 
-.015 
(-0.46) 
 
-3.349 
(-0.86) 
 
yes 
 
 
 
900 
 
-.404*** 
(-4.23) 
 
-.0652 
(-1.06) 
 
.4231*** 
(8.29) 
 
.113 
(1.88)* 
 
3.117 
(0.52) 
 
yes 
 
60 
 
900 
 
-0.404*** 
(-5.20) 
 
-.065 
(-1.37) 
 
.423*** 
(11.11) 
 
.113** 
(2.21) 
 
3.117 
(0.80) 
 
yes 
 
 
 
900 
 
-.402*** 
(-9.12) 
 
-.069** 
(-2.28) 
 
.401*** 
(16.18) 
 
.039 
(1.40) 
 
6.78* 
(1.87) 
 
yes 
 
 
 
900 
Note: *, ** and *** denote rejection of H0 at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4: Results for the Short-Panel Data Techniques (1951–1995)  
 
 
 
LNRER 
[1] 
 
FE (Within) 
[2] 
 
FE (Within) 
 
[3] 
 
Diff-GMM 
[One-Step] 
[4] 
 
Sys-GMM 
[One-Step] 
[5] 
 
Diff-GMM 
[Two-Step] 
[6] 
 
Sys-GMM 
[Two-Step] 
 
LNPROD 
 
 
LNTOT 
 
 
LNOPEN 
 
 
LNGOV 
 
 
 
Time Dummies 
 
Country Dummies 
 
Group Average 
 
Number of Lags 
 
Sargan Test 
[Prob > chi-squared] 
 
Observations 
 
-.515*  
(-2.00) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
675 
 
-.287* 
(-1.88) 
 
-.059 
(-0.73) 
 
.463** 
(4.38) 
 
.163 
(0.88) 
 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
675 
 
-.293*** 
(-4.07) 
 
-.106 
(-1.56) 
 
.214*** 
(4.55) 
 
.189*** 
(3.16) 
 
 
yes 
 
 
 
42 
 
2 
 
 
0.000 
 
630 
 
-.016* 
(-1.86) 
 
-.097** 
(-2.18) 
 
.071*** 
(3.15) 
 
-.043 
(-1.59) 
 
 
yes 
 
 
 
43 
 
2 
 
 
0.000 
 
645 
 
-.417*  
(-1.85) 
 
-.093 
(-0.89) 
 
.090 
(0.36) 
 
.379 
(0.83) 
 
 
yes 
 
 
 
42 
 
2 
 
 
.884 
 
630 
 
-.026** 
(-2.31) 
 
-.120 
(-0.43) 
 
.173** 
(2.20) 
 
-.075 
(-0.55) 
 
 
yes 
 
 
 
43 
 
2 
 
 
.999 
 
645 
Note:  
(4) t-statistics are in parentheses. 
(5) *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
(6) FE = Fixed-effects Estimator, Diff = Difference Estimator, and Sys = System Estimator. 
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Table 5: Results for Long-Panel Data Techniques (1951–1995) 
 
Variable 
[1] 
OLS_iid 
[2] 
OLS_cor 
[3] 
OLS_DK 
[4] 
AR1_cor 
[5] 
FGLSAR1_cor 
[6] 
FGLSCAR 
 
LNPROD 
 
 
LNTOT 
 
 
LNOPEN 
 
 
LNGOV 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
Time Dummies 
 
Group Average 
 
Observations 
 
-.303*** 
(-6.85) 
 
-.025 
(-0.47) 
 
.109*** 
(3.52) 
 
-.052 
(-1.59) 
 
-11.11** 
(-4.42) 
 
yes 
 
45 
 
675 
 
-.303*** 
(-9.71) 
 
-.025 
(-0.50) 
 
.109*** 
(3.78) 
 
-.052** 
(-2.15) 
 
-11.11*** 
(-3.92) 
 
yes 
 
45 
 
675 
 
-.303*** 
(-7.40) 
 
-.025 
(-.21) 
 
.109 
(1.47) 
 
-.052 
(-1.10) 
 
-11.11* 
(-1.95) 
 
yes 
 
 
 
675 
 
-.341*** 
(-3.02) 
 
-.063 
(-.87) 
 
.428*** 
(7.11) 
 
.105 
(1.45) 
 
-4.554 
(-0.53) 
 
yes 
 
45 
 
675 
 
-.341*** 
(-3.56) 
 
-.063 
(-1.14) 
 
.428*** 
(9.34) 
 
.105* 
(1.72) 
 
-4.554 
(-0.77) 
 
yes 
 
 
 
675 
 
-.352*** 
(-6.87) 
 
-.068** 
(-2.04) 
 
.389*** 
(13.89) 
 
.034 
(1.00) 
 
-2.198 
(-0.44) 
 
yes 
 
 
 
675 
Note: *, ** and *** denote rejection of H0 at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 6: Results for the Short-Panel Data Techniques (1996–2010) 
 
 
 
LNRER 
[1] 
 
FE (Within) 
[2] 
 
FE (Within) 
 
[3] 
 
Diff-GMM 
[One-Step] 
[4] 
 
Sys-GMM 
[One-Step] 
[5] 
 
Diff-GMM 
[Two-Step] 
[6] 
 
Sys-GMM 
[Two-Step] 
 
LNPROD 
 
 
LNTOT 
 
 
LNOPEN 
 
 
LNGOV 
 
 
 
Time Dummies 
 
Country Dummies 
 
Group Average 
 
Number of Lags 
 
Sargan Test 
[Prob > chi-squared] 
 
Observations 
 
-.918***  
(-3.44) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
225 
 
-.992*** 
(-4.36) 
 
-.315 
(-1.35) 
 
.576*** 
(3.51) 
 
-.156** 
(-2.61) 
 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
225 
 
-.453*** 
(-9.05) 
 
-.149 
(-1.22) 
 
.195** 
(2.19) 
 
.083 
(0.59) 
 
 
yes 
 
 
 
12 
 
2 
 
 
0.000 
 
180 
 
-.453*** 
(-7.70) 
 
-.164 
(-1.55) 
 
-.127*** 
(-4.11) 
 
-.033 
(-0.65) 
 
 
yes 
 
 
 
13 
 
2 
 
 
0.000 
 
195 
 
-.840***  
(-9.56) 
 
.067 
(0.44) 
 
.214 
(1.53) 
 
.296 
(1.06) 
 
 
yes 
 
 
 
12 
 
2 
 
 
0.895 
 
180 
 
-.333*** 
(-3.50) 
 
.134 
(0.91) 
 
-.140 
(-1.49) 
 
.034** 
(2.25) 
 
 
yes 
 
 
 
13 
 
2 
 
 
0.963 
 
180 
Note:  
(7) t-statistics are in parentheses. 
(8) *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
(9) FE = Fixed-effects Estimator, Diff = Difference Estimator, and Sys = System Estimator. 
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Table 7: Results for Long-Panel Data Techniques (1996–2010) 
 
Variable 
[1] 
OLS_iid 
[2] 
OLS_cor 
[3] 
OLS_DK 
[4] 
AR1_cor 
[5] 
FGLSAR1_cor 
[6] 
FGLSCAR 
 
LNPROD 
 
 
LNTOT 
 
 
LNOPEN 
 
 
LNGOV 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
Time Dummies 
 
Group Average 
 
Observations 
 
-.408*** 
(-11.50) 
 
.592*** 
(4.25) 
 
.121*** 
(3.67) 
 
.034 
(1.11) 
 
14.768** 
(2.22) 
 
yes 
 
15 
 
225 
 
-.408*** 
(-14.02) 
 
.592*** 
(4.20) 
 
.121*** 
(4.13) 
 
.034** 
(2.35) 
 
14.768 
(1.47) 
 
yes 
 
15 
 
225 
 
-.408*** 
(-9.32) 
 
.591*** 
(7.15) 
 
.121*** 
(3.57) 
 
.034* 
(2.08) 
 
14.768 
(0.99) 
 
yes 
 
 
 
225 
 
-.484*** 
(-6.51) 
 
.014 
(0.13) 
 
.274*** 
(4.07) 
 
.041 
(0.80) 
 
16.752 
(0.93) 
 
yes 
 
15 
 
225 
 
-.485*** 
(-6.44) 
 
.012 
(0.14) 
 
.276*** 
(5.57) 
 
.042 
(0.68) 
 
16.781* 
(1.83) 
 
yes 
 
 
 
225 
 
-.494*** 
(-14.15) 
 
.019 
(1.38) 
 
.281*** 
(13.91) 
 
.042*** 
(6.54) 
 
16.156*** 
(6.77) 
 
yes 
 
 
 
225 
Note: *, ** and *** denote rejection of H0 at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
